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Genes for Free: The Effect of Publication of
the Human Genome on the Patentability of
Genes and Gene-Based Inventions
by Robert S. Schwartz*
I. Introduction
The pioneering case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty' broadly
construed the utility requirement of the patent statutes 2 and
established that "anything under the sun that is made by man"
is patentable. 3 This holding, inter alia, opened the door to the
patentability of genetic material (genes and related polynucleo-
tides)4 and products based on the exploitation of genes,5 and fa-
* Robert S. Schwartz received his J.D., magna cum laude, from Pace Univer-
sity School of Law in 2003. He received a B.S. in biology, magna cum laude, from
the State University of New York at Albany in 1975, and a Ph.D. in nutritional
biochemistry, summa cum laude, from the University of California at Berkeley in
1981. Prior to attending law school, he was a staff member at the Oakland Chil-
dren's Hospital Research Institute, Oakland, CA, and the Department of Medicine
at Albert Einstein College of Medicine, Bronx, NY.
1. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (granted patent protection to
living, naturally occurring microorganisms because the microorganisms had been
altered by human introduction of non-naturally occurring material, causing them
to have different properties than their non-manipulated naturally occurring
counterparts).
2. The utility requirement of the patent act is codified in 35 U.S.C. § 101
(2003) ("Whoever invents or discovers a new and useful process, machine, manu-
facture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.").
3. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
4. A gene is the physical and functional unit of heredity, which carries infor-
mation from one generation to the next. It is the entire DNA sequence necessary
for production of a functional protein or RNA. All naturally occurring DNA con-
tains four chemical moieties called nucleotide bases; adenine (A), thymine (T), gua-
1
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cilitated the soon to follow biotechnology revolution. 6 Courts
were quick to appreciate the unprecedented potential of this
biotechnology revolution 7 and were legitimately concerned
nine (G), and cytosine (C). These four bases are repeated in a particular non-
random order in a gene and contain within their specific ordering all the informa-
tion required for a cell to synthesize a protein unique for that DNA sequence (See
infra note 5). Genes also contain regions of DNA that do not encode for proteins
(introns and non-coding regions) but play other roles such as regulation of the ex-
pression of that gene. Structurally, a gene is a double-stranded molecule in which
the two DNA strands are oriented in an antiparallel fashion, and the nucleotide
bases which comprise each strand hydrogen-bond to those of the opposing strand
based on their complementarity. One DNA strand codes for the protein of interest,
and is thus referred to as the "coding" or "sense" strand. The opposing, comple-
mentary strand is referred to as the "template" or "antisense" strand. See gener-
ally BENJAMIN LEWIN, 7 GENES 6-9, 119-20 (2000).
5. The products of genes are proteins that are composed of a polymer of inter-
connecting amino acids encoded for by the DNA of that gene. Proteins are the
cellular workhorses and participate in nearly all cellular processes. The human
genome comprises approximately 30,000 genes. See J.C. Venter et al., The Se-
quence of the Human Genome, 291 SCIENCE 1304, 1305-51 (2001). While DNA typ-
ically exists in a double helical structure, proteins exist in more complex structures
(the predominate forms being globular, helical and sheeted) that are largely deter-
mined by the amino acid composition of the protein. To a large extent it is the
three dimensional structure of proteins that confer their physical and functional
properties. A protein's spatial structure is now often used to aid in the design of
pharmaceuticals. See generally MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 129-44 (Bruce
Alberts et al. eds., 4th ed. 2002).
6. It is generally regarded that the biotechnology revolution was started by
the combined efforts of venture capitalist Robert A. Swanson and Stanford Univer-
sity Professor Herbert W. Boyer, who founded the world's first biotechnology com-
pany Genentech in April 1976. Today Genentech is one of the world's largest
biotechnology companies with annual revenues in excess of $2.7 billion.
Genentech website, at http://www.gene.com/gene/ir/financials/annual-reports/
2002/financials.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2003).
7. Gene-based recombinant protein technology has revolutionized the manner
in which proteins are produced. Before recombinant protein technology it was nec-
essary to isolate and purify proteins from natural sources. This was tedious and
impractical for low-abundance proteins. See MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL,
supra note 5, at 492-513. This process also had the limitation that only naturally
occurring proteins could be produced; modified proteins, which often have benefi-
cial properties compared to their naturally occurring counterparts, could only be
produced through post-purification manipulations. In addition, traditional protein
purifications were costly. Id. The development of recombinant protein technology
eliminated the need to isolate and purify proteins from their natural sources. Id.
Genes, or synthetic DNA, encoding those proteins could be used to direct other
cells to synthesize the protein(s) encoded by the inserted DNA. Id. The result of
recombinant protein technology was that commercial production of proteins was
no longer tied to the availability of natural sources. Id. For example, prior to re-
combinant protein technology, insulin, a protein hormone required for glucose me-
tabolism, and which is either defective or produced in insufficient quantities in
732
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about granting too wide a scope of patent protection for gene-
based inventions to the first entrants.8 This was necessary to
prevent first entrants from monopolizing the new technology,9 a
result that the courts feared would stifle its development. As
will be discussed below, the primary method the courts used to
achieve this was to define a gene as a chemical compound and
apply analogous patentability standards. The result was that
genes were not held to be patentable unless the entire structure
(i.e., the entire nucleotide sequence) of the gene was disclosed.' 0
However, by focusing on the gene's structure rather than on the
properties of the proteins encoded by those genes, the courts did
not anticipate that the nucleotide sequence of every gene"
diabetics (resulting in the inability to maintain normal blood "sugar" levels), had to
be physically purified from natural sources, usually animal tissue. See Regents of
Univ. Calif. v. Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d 1559, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1997). This greatly reduced
both the availability of insulin for therapeutic use as well as increasing its cost. Id.
In addition, purification of proteins from animal tissues has associated risks of co-
purification of animal viruses and other pathogens, and since the insulin produced
is non-human, it may cause allergic reactions in sensitive individuals. Id. Recom-
binant DNA technology changed that by permitting the production of insulin (and
essentially any other protein) in laboratory cell culture, avoiding the necessity of
using animal tissues. Id. Most importantly, recombinant protein technology al-
lowed the commercial production of human proteins, which, prior to this technol-
ogy, were often impossible to produce commercially due to the unavailability of
large amounts of human tissue needed for protein purification. Id. In addition to
its clinical utility for human and other animal diseases, recombinant protein tech-
nology also has revolutionized agribusiness by allowing for the introduction of new
genes (and hence new properties) into crops that has dramatically affected the ag-
.ricultural industries of the United States and, particularly, third world countries
where agriculture remains the primary source of the economy. See Margaret R.
Grossman, American Law in a Time of Global Interdependence, 50 AM. J. COMP. L.
215-17 (2002).
8. See Michael D. Davis, The Patenting of Products of Nature, 21 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 293 (1995).
9. Patent protection gives the inventor the exclusive right to make, use, or sell
the patented product for a statutory time period (20 years from the patent applica-
tion filing date for applications filed on or after June 8, 1995 or 17 years from the
date of patent issuance for applications filed before June 8, 1995). See 35 U.S.C.
§ 154 (2003).
10. The courts used primarily the written description requirement set out in
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2003), paragraph 1. The policy behind the written description
requirement is to guard "against the inventor's overreaching by insisting that he
recount his invention in such detail that his future claims can be determined to be
encompassed within his original creation." Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d
1555, 1561 (Fed Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). See also infra Part IV.
11. See infra Part II.
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would someday be known and publicly available. 12 As this Note
will argue, the publication of the human genome13 will necessa-
rily require a reconsideration of the patentability requirements
for gene-based inventions, and, will most likely lead to signifi-
cant short-term uncertainty concerning the patentability stan-
dards for such inventions. This uncertainty likely will result in
substantial litigation regarding both the granting of gene-based
patents by the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO),' 4 as well as the validity of subsequently issued patents.
This Note will also discuss potential economic ramifications
flowing from these patentability uncertainties such as risk
avoidance through licensing and academic-commercial collabo-
rations. Ultimately, the publication of the human genome1 5 (as
well as the genomes from other species),' 6 should stimulate the
evolution of new legal standards for the patentability of genes
and gene-based inventions.
II. Sequencing the Human Genome
In 1990, the United States launched the Human Genome
Project (HGP) as a research effort funded largely by the Depart-
ment of Energy and the National Institutes of Health (NIH).
Initially, the HGP had three goals: (1) to identify all of the
genes that constitute the human genome;' 7 (2) to determine the
sequence of the genome's predicted three billion chemical ba-
12. As discussed infra Part V, the public availability of a gene's complete nu-
cleotide sequence makes that gene unpatentable by being both anticipated and ob-
vious over the prior art.
13. Venter et al., supra note 5, at 1305-51.
14. The organization and responsibilities of the PTO are governed by 35
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2003).
15. A "genome" refers to the entire collection of an organism's genes. See Mo-
LECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL, supra note 5, at G:15.
16. In addition to the human genome, the genomes of mouse, rat, zebrafish,
human malaria parasite, frit-fly, and over one-hundred invertebrate, bacterial
and viral genomes have been sequenced as of January 2003. Sequencing projects
are also underway for many agriculturally important plant species. See http:/!
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov (last visited Dec. 3, 2003).
17. The original estimates of anywhere from 100,000 to 50,000 genes in the
human genome was reduced to approximately 30,000 after the first draft of the
human genome was published. What is remarkable about this number is that it
represents only a two-fold increase over the number of genes in a simple organism




ses;' 8 and (3) to license subsequently related technologies to the
private sector.19 However, the efforts of the HGP were soon
overshadowed by the introduction into the race of the "startup"
genomics company Celera Genomics.20 The company's C.E.O.,
J. Craig Venter, 21 claimed Celera would unilaterally sequence
the entire human genome in five years or less.22 Celera and the
HGP jointly published, to great fanfare, the first draft of the
human genome on February 16, 2001.23
III. Obtaining A Patent
Creating property rights in new inventions was considered
by our founding fathers to be of such importance to America's
development that it was included into the first draft of the
United States Constitution. 24 The Constitution grants Con-
gress the power to issue patents "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Au-
thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings and Discoveries." 25 The quid pro quo for the state-
sponsored limited monopoly is the requirement that the inven-
tor disclose his invention in such detail as to allow anyone in
that field to reproduce it.26 The public policy rationale underly-
ing this quid pro quo is that public disclosure of inventions will
benefit development of American society. 27
18. The individual nucleotides that comprise DNA are determined by a pro-
cess called nucleotide "sequencing." See MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL, supra
note 5, at 504-08.
19. See The Human Genome Resources, available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.
gov/genome/seq (last visited Dec. 3, 2003).
20. Celera Genomics (now Celera), at http://www.celera.com/index.cfm (last
visited Dec. 3, 2003).
21. Dr. Venter stepped down as C.E.O. of Celera Genomics on January 22,
2002. See Andrew Pollack, Scientist Quits the Company He Led in Quest for Gen-
ome, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2002, at C1.
22. See D. Butler, Publication of Human Genomes Sparks Fresh Sequence De-
bate, 409 NATURE 747, 747-48 (2001).
23. As of April 2003 approximately 100% of the human genome has been se-
quenced and made available free of charge to the public. NATIONAL HUMAN GEN-
OME RESEARCH INSTITUTE, at http://www/genome/gov/11006929 (last visited Dec. 3,
2003).
24. THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY JAMES
MADISON 545 (Gaillard Hunt & James B. Scott eds., 1920).
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
26. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.




To be patentable and thus deserving of protection under the
United States patent laws, an inventor is required to demon-
strate that the subject matter of the invention falls within one
of the four statutory patentable areas: (1) new and useful
processes, (2) machines, (3) manufacture, and (4) compositions
of matter.28 If the subject matter of the invention is patentable
the inventor must further demonstrate that it has a practical
utility,29 that the invention is novel,30 and that the invention is
non-obvious over the prior art.31 Only when the invention satis-
fies each of these statutory requirements can a U.S. patent is-
sue for that invention. Once a patent is granted, the inventor
obtains several important legal rights, not the least of which is
the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the
patented invention in the United States for the statutory mo-
nopoly period, currently twenty years from the date the patent
application was filed. 32
A. Utility
The patent statute 35 U.S.C. § 10133 broadly defines pat-
entable subject matter as "any new and useful process, ma-
chine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof."34 To satisfy utility the invention
must confer on society some tangible benefit.
Prior to the human genome publication gene-based inven-
tions had little difficulty in satisfying the utility requirement
because the threshold the courts used to satisfy utility was min-
imal. 35 The statutory requirement was simply that the claimed
28. These statutory bases are set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 101.
29. Utility is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 101. See infra Part III-A and accompa-
nying notes.
30. Novelty is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2003). See infra Part III-B and
accompanying notes.
31. Non-obviousness is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2003). See infra Part III-
C and accompanying notes.
32. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
33. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
34. See id.
35. See, e.g., Ex parte Drulard, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 364 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int.
1983) (holding patentable a portable lightning rod which, even though potentially
unsafe, was sufficiently useful to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 101's utility requirement).
736 [Vol. 23:731
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invention must have some practical application or use. 36 The
product did not have to be superior to any current product, it
merely had to be "useful." The utility standard was expanded
somewhat for chemical agents during the 1950's to the extent
that no utility was found for chemicals that had only specula-
tive use; a "specific" use became the requirement.37 The utility
requirement was considered by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Brenner v. Manson.38 Inventor Manson filed an application to
patent a process for producing certain steroids and requested
"interference" be declared to establish that his patent applica-
tion had priority over a patent that had issued in the year previ-
ous to his application allegedly covering the same process.39
Manson's patent application was rejected by the PTO for failure
to "disclose any utility for" the compound produced by the pro-
cess. 40 In appealing the decision, Manson noted that steroids of
the class which included the compound produced by his process
were undergoing screening for possible tumor-inhibiting effects
in mice. A homologue 41 of his steroid had proven effective in
that test.42 Manson also argued that his process was "useful" in
that it produced a product that belonged to a class of compounds
36. Courts have often seen fit to allow market forces to determine an inven-
tion's societal benefit when considering whether a new invention is of lesser or
greater benefit to society than a preexisting invention of the same type. See e.g.,
Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8565) (holding that
inventions that are not more useful than other similar inventions of that type "will
silently sink into contempt and disregard").
37. See, e.g., In re Bremmer, 182 F.2d 216 (C.C.P.A. 1950). In this case the
patent application disclosed a novel chemical structure but did not assert any spe-
cific use for that chemical. Id. The court found the patent invalid for failure to
satisfy the 35 U.S.C. § 101 utility requirement, holding that disclosure of a new
chemical compound required a disclosure of some specific asserted utility for that
compound. Id. The court, however, did not specify what a specific utility is,
thereby maintaining a low threshold for satisfying the statutory requirement.
38. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
39. The right to a patent in the U.S. is based on a first to invent system.
Thus, a party who is second to file a patent application may nevertheless be
awarded the patent if he can prove that he was the first to invent. The procedure
by which priority is determined is called an "interference." Interference actions
are conducted within the PTO but are similar to judicial actions in most respects.
See generally 1 CHISUM ON PATENTS (2003).
40. Manson, 383 U.S. at 521.
41. A homologue (or homolog) is a chemical compound having a structural
similarity with another compound. See MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL, supra
note 5, at G:17.
42. Manson, 383 U.S. at 522.
7
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that were the subject of serious scientific research. 43 The Court
disagreed with Manson's arguments and it held that a process
that results in a product whose only established utility is an
object of further scientific inquiry does not satisfy the statutory
utility requirement." The Court also rejected the argument
that utility of a chemical compound can be established by show-
ing that it is structurally homologous to related chemicals hav-
ing established utility.45 Thus, the Court suggested that, for
chemical compounds, 46 prediction of function based on struc-
tural homology will not satisfy the utility requirement without
some additional testing to demonstrate a product's usefulness. 47
B. Novelty
The patent applicant also must demonstrate that his inven-
tion is novel. Novelty is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 102.48 Occur-
rence of any of the following situations will preclude the
invention's patentability: It was already (1) patented in the
United States or a foreign country;49 (2) described in a printed
43. Id. at 532.
44. Id. at 535-36:
We find absolutely no warrant for the proposition that although Congress
intended that no patent be granted on a chemical compound whose sole
"utility" consists of its potential role as an object of use-testing, a different
set of rules was meant to apply to the process which yielded the unpatent-
able product. That proposition seems to us little more that an attempt to
evade the impact of the rules which concededly govern patentability of the
product itself.... [A] patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for
the search, but compensation for its successful conclusion.
Id.
45. The Court stated: "Even on the assumption that the process would be pat-
entable were respondent to show that the steroid produced had a tumor-inhibiting
effect in mice, we would not overrule the Patent Office finding that respondent has
not made such a showing." Id. at 531-32.
46. Genes have been treated like chemical compounds for many patentability
purposes. See infra Part IV.
47. This is because, as the Court noted, the properties of some chemicals are
unpredictable. Manson, 383 U.S. at 532. Later holdings have established that ex-
perimental testing of compounds to establish their utility as effective in humans
does not require actual testing in humans; utility will be established if the testing
is done in the laboratory using a system whose results are known to be predictive
of results in the body. See, e.g., Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1564-65
(Fed. Cir. 1996).
48. See 35 U.S.C. § 102.
49. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).
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publication in the United States or a foreign country;50 or (3)
known, used, or offered for sale by others in the United States.51
The novelty requirement may prove to be a formidable bar to
patentability of genes because the publication of the human
genome would anticipate that claimed gene and create a prima
facie case for lack of novelty, barring its patentability. 52
C. Non-Obviousness
Whereas the 35 U.S.C. § 102 novelty requirement insures
that the claimed invention is new, the non-obvious requirement
insures that the claimed invention represents a significant im-
provement over the prior art.53 According to 35 U.S.C. § 103,54 a
patent may not be obtained "if the differences between the sub-
ject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that
the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the
time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill
in the art to which said subject matter pertains."55 Subsequent
to the publication of the human genome, the non-obviousness
requirement will impose additional hurdles in obtaining prop-
erty on gene-based inventions.
Determination of the non-obviousness of a claimed inven-
tion requires a three part test:5 6 (1) a case-by-case analysis of
50. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b): To be anticipated, all of the elements of a patent
claim must be present in a single publication. The publication must occur more
than one year prior to the filing date of the patent application.
51. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). The use or sale of the invention must have oc-
curred more than one year prior to the filing date of the patent application.
52. In addition to the 35 U.S.C. § 102 requirements, the patent application
disclosure must enable one of ordinary skill in the art to "make or use" the inven-
tion. The enablement requirements are governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112. See infra
Part V.
53. See 35 U.S.C. § 103.
54. See id.
55. See id. § 103(a).
56. See Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966). The Graham court stated
that although "the ultimate question of patent validity is one of law ... the § 103
condition lends itself to several basic factual inquiries." Id. at 17. According to the
Court these inquiries are: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the differ-
ences between the prior art and the claims at issue; and (3) the level of ordinary
skill in the pertinent art. Id. Against this background, the obviousness of the
claimed subject matter is determined. In addition, the Court discussed the impor-
tance of what are known as secondary considerations to the question of obvi-
ousness: "Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but
unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circum-
9
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the scope and content of the prior art; (2) a determination of the
differences between the prior art and the invention; and (3) a
determination of the level of skill of the ordinary worker in that
art at the time the invention was made. A critical consideration
for biotechnology inventions is that the scope of knowledge and
technical expertise in these arts is expanding exponentially
making it increasingly difficult to justify the non-obviousness of
these inventions.57 An early case testing the limits of non-obvi-
ousness to the developing field of biotechnology was In re
O'Farrell.58 In this case, the PTO examiner issued a final rejec-
tion of the application based on 35 U.S.C. § 10359 obviousness
over a combination of prior art references disclosing techniques
for producing recombinant proteins, that was upheld by the
PTO Board.60 The inventors argued that the invention could
not have been obvious due to the significant unpredictability in
the field of molecular biology at the time of the patent applica-
tion."' The court rejected this argument holding that unpredict-
ability per se was not controlling; what was critical in a 35
U.S.C. § 10362 non-obviousness analysis was whether one of or-
dinary skill in that art would have considered that prior art
techniques employed were likely to succeed.6 3
Given this rather loose standard, it would appear that as
biotechnology grew in complexity and the predictability of its
techniques became accepted, there could come a time when al-
most any "new" biotechnology invention would arguably fail to
meet the non-obviousness requirement. Possibly recognizing
stances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented. As
indicia of obviousness or non-obviousness, these inquiries may have relevancy."
Id. at 17-18.
57. For the biochemistry and molecular biology arts the courts have held that
the level of skill of the ordinary skilled worker is at the post-graduate level, i.e., an
M.D. or Ph.D. degree or its equivalent. See Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA,
Inc., No. 01-048-JJF, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15235, at *66 (D. Del. Aug. 28, 2003).
58. See In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
59. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
60. O'Farrell, 853 F.2d at 895.
61. Id. at 902.
62. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
63. Id. at 903. As the court stated: "Obviousness does not require absolute
predictability of success. Indeed, for many inventions that seem quite obvious,
there is no absolute predictability of success until the invention is reduced to prac-
tice .... For obviousness under § 103, all that is required is a reasonable expecta-
tion of success." Id. (citations omitted).
[Vol. 23:731740
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this dilemma, later courts, construing the non-obviousness re-
quirement for biotechnology inventions, increased the degree of
certainty required to satisfy a finding of "reasonable expecta-
tion of success." For example, in In re Deuel,64 a case involving
recombinant produced cell growth factors, 65 the examiner (and
later the PTO Board) rejected claims to the gene for these
growth factors and the methods of producing the gene-products
(proteins) recombinantly under 35 U.S.C. § 103 obviousness6 6
because the protein sequence 67 had already been disclosed and
methods of producing recombinant proteins were well estab-
lished.68 The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the disclo-
sure of a protein sequence does not render the gene sequence for
that protein obvious, 69 the most that it does is to make it
"'[o]bvious to try' [which] has long been held not to constitute
obviousness."70 By this holding, the Deuel court narrowed the
"reasonable expectation of success" standard71 of the 35 U.S.C.
§ 10372 obviousness test (at least as it applies to recombinant
proteins) to exclude inventive steps that, while arguably being
64. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
65. The growth factors were a class of proteins called heparin-binding growth
factors involved in stimulating cell division (mitogenesis) and DNA repair. See
L.W. Haynes, Fibroblast (Heparin-Binding) Growth Factors in Neuronal Develop-
ment and Repair, 2 MOL. NEUROBIOL. 263 (1988).
66. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
67. Proteins are biological molecules of enormous importance and comprise a
class that includes, inter alia, enzymes, growth factors, receptors, neurotransmit-
ters, structural materials and hormones. Proteins consist of polymers of amino
acids connected by peptide bonds; each amino acid is encoded for by the corre-
sponding triplet codon in the gene for that protein. If the protein represents less
than the entire gene it is referred to as a peptide. The individual amino acids of
the protein can either be deduced from its corresponding genetic code or can be
measured directly by a technique called protein sequencing. See generally MOLEC-
ULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL, supra note 5, at 129-58.
68. See Ex parte Deuel, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1445 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1993).
69. The court reasoned that the present invention was the DNA encoding the
protein, not the protein itself (which was taught in the prior art). See In re Deuel,
51 F.3d 1552, 1558 (1995). Because of the redundancy of the genetic code, that is,
for many amino acids there are several different DNA sequences that can encode
them, describing a protein sequence does not expressly describe the DNA se-
quence. Id.
70. Id. at 1559.
71. See In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 904 (1988).
72. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
11
PACE LAW REVIEW
"likely" to succeed, nevertheless include the "possibility" of
failure. 73
This ruling, however, created a dilemma; on the one hand it
was arguably necessary to prevent recombinant protein inven-
tions from becoming unpatentable due to obviousness. On the
other hand the ruling created a fiction by ignoring that by 1993
(the year of the Deuel decision 74), the technical capabilities of
the ordinary molecular biologist had increased to the point
where it was "cookbook" to create a recombinant protein once
the protein sequence was known. 75 Thus, the court's perceived
fear of limiting the scope of patentable biotechnology inventions
may have forced them to create a standard out-of-touch with
the technical realities of the field and, in so doing, create confu-
sion regarding patentability standards of these inventions.
IV. Patentability of DNA
The first case specifically outlining the patentability re-
quirements for DNA was Amgen v. Chugai Pharmaceutical.76
In this case, Amgen had been awarded a patent whose claims
included, inter alia, the cDNA77 for the gene encoding human
erythropoietin (EPO).78 Amgen's EPO cDNA claims were broad
and as written included the entire universe of EPO cDNAs, in-
cluding those from other animal species. The only practical lim-
itation in the claims was that the EPO must be capable of
stimulating red blood cell production, that is, the gene was now
73. In the O'Farrell court's analysis the possibility of failure is described as
"the possibility of unexpected results." O'Farrell, 858 F.2d at 903.
74. Ex parte Deuel, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1445 (Rd. Pat. App. & Int. 1993).
75. See JOSEPH SAMBROOK ET AL., MOLECULAR CLONING: A LABORATORY MAN-
UAL (2d ed. 1989).
76. 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
77. cDNA, or coding DNA, is the portion of the gene that contains the informa-
tion that is used to produce the protein the gene encodes. The cDNA is converted
into protein by a series of steps that includes first, the transfer of the genetic infor-
mation from the cDNA to a corresponding mRNA (messenger RNA) within the
cell's nucleus. The mRNA is then transported into the cell's extra-nuclear com-
partment where it is converted into the corresponding protein by a process called
translation. See generally 7 GENES, supra note 4, at 119-37.
78. EPO is a hormone-like protein produced in the kidney that stimulates the
production of red blood cells in the bone marrow. EPO levels are reduced in pa-
tients with kidney disease which results in some cases in life-threatening anemia
requiring chronic blood transfusions. Kidney patients receiving pharmaceutical




defined not by its structure but by its function.79 The Amgen
court held that a generic DNA claim could only be patentable °
by disclosure in the patent specification of a sufficient number
of DNA species to demonstrate that the inventors knew how to
make and use the genus of EPO DNA's they were claiming.8'
Since the court found that Amgen only disclosed a few EPO
DNA species, they were not entitled to claim the entire genus,
and invalidated the broad EPO DNA claims.8 2 What is most
significant in the Amgen decision is that the court refused to
allow a gene to be described by its function; they required that
it be described by its structure, that is, the precise recitation of
the nucleic acids that constitute the DNA for that gene.8 3
Two years later the court revisited the requirements for
DNA patentability in Fiers v. Revel.84 The Fiers case began as a
patent interference action85 in the PT08 6 between three foreign
inventors who each claimed, inter alia, to have been the first to
invent the cDNA encoding the human protein beta-interferon
(B-IF).8 7 The PTO did not award the invention to Fiers, but to
another inventor, Sugano, and Fiers appealed the PTO's deci-
sion.88 The Federal Circuit affirmed the PTO's decision holding
that Fiers did not conceive of the invention8 9 because his origi-
79. Essentially any EPO whether from humans or closely related mammals is
capable of performing this function.
80. The Amgen court's patentability argument was based on the 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 enablement requirement. See Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1213-14; 35 U.S.C. § 112.
81. See Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1213-14.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 1214.
84. 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
85. See CHISUM, supra note 39.
86. Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1166.
87. Interferon is a protein that promotes cellular resistance to viral infection.
See T.C. Merigan, Interferons of Mice and Men, 276 N. ENG. J. MED. 913 (1967).
88. See Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1164.
89. Conception is the touchstone of "invention." It is the mental part of inven-
tiveness. In the United States, the first inventor to conceive the invention is the
one who is awarded patent protection, so long as the inventor reduces the inven-
tion to practice (i.e., provides information or an actual prototype that shows how to
use the invention for its intended purpose) and does not abandon, suppress, or
conceal the invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (A person shall be entitled to a pat-
ent unless ... (g) before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made
in this country by another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it).
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nal application, from which he was claiming priority,90 "dis-
closed a method for isolating a fragment of the DNA coding for
B-IF, but did not disclose a complete DNA sequence coding for
B-IF."91 The court re-affirmed the principles set out in Amgen
that a gene cannot be described by its biologic function but only
by its structure: "The present [invention] is to a product, a DNA
which codes for B-IF; it is a claim to a product having a particu-
lar biologic activity or function, and in Amgen, we held that
such a product is not conceived until one can define it other
than by its biologic activity or function."92 The court went on to
explain: "An adequate written description of a DNA requires
more than a mere statement that it is part of the invention and
reference to a potential method for isolating it; what is required
is a description of the DNA itself."93 Because Sugano, but not
Fiers, disclosed the entire nucleotide sequence of the B-IF
cDNA in his patent application, Sugano was awarded priority of
the invention.9 4
The most recent case in the gene patentability "trilogy" is
Regents of University of California v. Eli Lilly,95 decided four
years after Fiers. This case was a patent infringement action
relating to recombinantly produced insulin.9 6 The University's
patent contained claims for recombinantly produced human in-
90. Priority in the patent regime is the date at which the patent application
was filed, but the patent will only be valid if the application's claims, as filed, met
all of the statutory requirements for patentability.
91. Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1167 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 1169.
93. Id. at 1170. But the standards for satisfying the written description re-
quirement for genes may be evolving as demonstrated by the recent Federal Cir-
cuit decision that reversed its prior position. It held that written description of a
gene can be satisfied by reference in the patent application of a deposition made
into a public depository of a cell or other genetic material containing the claimed
gene, even if the inventors did not disclose the gene sequence in the application.
See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 296 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
94. See Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1164.
95. 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
96. Insulin is a protein hormone produced in the pancreas and secreted into
the bloodstream and is required for the cellular metabolism of glucose. Insulin
deficiency may result in diabetes, which, in severe cases, requires daily injections
of insulin. Until the advent of recombinant protein biotechnology, insulin was pro-
duced from pancreatic tissue of animals, which could, in some cases, cause allergic
reactions in sensitive individuals. Recombinant protein biotechnology allowed for
the production of human insulin which is much less likely to cause allergic reac-




sulin although the patent specification disclosed the DNA se-
quence of rat insulin only. The University argued that by
disclosing the nucleotide sequence for rat insulin, combined
with the knowledge in the molecular biology arts of the methods
for obtaining cDNAs, they had enabled one of ordinary skill to
make human insulin cDNA.97 The court disagreed, upholding
the Amgen/Fiers requirement that DNA be described (for pur-
poses of 35 U.S.C. § 112 enablement) by its nucleotide sequence,
not by its function.98 Thus, by these three cases, the Federal
Circuit seemingly established a bright-line rule that for pur-
poses of gene patentability, a gene is defined by its structure
(i.e., its DNA sequence) and not by its function (i.e., its biologic
activity).
V. Patentability of Genes Following the Human
Genome Publication
Since the Federal Circuit has defined a gene by its DNA
sequence for purposes of patentability, there is little doubt that
the publication of the complete human genome results in the
unpatentability of all human genes described in that publica-
tion by virtue of failing the test of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).99 As a
result, claims to naturally occurring human genes or gene frag-
ments in applications submitted after February 16, 2002100 are
97. See Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1567.
98. Id. As the Lilly court stated:
The name cDNA is not itself a written description of that DNA; it conveys no
distinguishing information concerning its identity. While the example pro-
vides a process for obtaining human insulin-encoding cDNA, there is no fur-
ther information in the patent pertaining to that cDNA's relevant structural
or physical characteristics; in other words, it thus does not describe human
insulin cDNA. Describing a method of preparing a cDNA or even describing
the protein that the cDNA encodes, as the example does, does not necessa-
rily describe the cDNA itself. No sequence information indicating which nu-
cleotides constitute human cDNA appears in the patent, as appears for rat
cDNA in Example 5 of the patent. Accordingly, the specification does not
provide a written description of [human insulin].
Id.
99. See supra Part III-B.
100. The CeleraIHGP collaboration published their results on February 16,
2001. See Venter et al., supra note 5, at C1. Therefore, for a 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
anticipation bar, patent applications containing claims to human genes or gene
fragments filed after February 16, 2002 are anticipated and hence unpatentable by




unpatentable for lack of novelty. 1 1 Therefore, inventions sub-
sequent to February 16, 2002 will no longer be able to monopo-
lize claims to the genes themselves, but must rely instead on
the patentability of some downstream product of the gene or
gene fragment. This does not mean, however, that all human
genes become unpatentable; only those genes described in the
human genome publication are anticipated; gene variants, mu-
tants, or polymorphisms not described in the human genome
publication remain patentable in so far as they are not antici-
pated. Moreover, not all of the approximately 30,000 "pre-
dicted" human genes have been structurally defined as of this
writing, and those "predicted" but as of yet undefined genes re-
main patentable until 1 year after they are structurally defined
by DNA sequencing.
A. Obviousness of Gene-Based Inventions
In addition to the anticipation and hence unpatentability of
the genes themselves resulting from the genome publication,
there are issues concerning whether other types of gene-based
inventions are made obvious and hence unpatentable. As dis-
cussed in Part III-C, the standards for 35 U.S.C. § 103 non-obvi-
ousness are derived from the Graham case, 10 2 and include: (1) a
case-by-case analysis of the scope and content of the prior art;
(2) an examination of the differences between the prior art and
the claims at issue; and (3) an ascertainment of the level of ordi-
nary skill of a person working in the pertinent art.10 3 To restate
the test in another way; an invention would be obvious if a com-
bination of the universe of knowledge in that discipline (i.e., the
scope and content of the prior art) and the technical expertise of
a person working in that discipline (i.e., the ordinary skilled
person) would have motivated that person to create the inven-
tion. 04 Thus, it is apparent that non-obviousness becomes more
101. See supra Part III-B.
102. See Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
103. In addition, the Court can also use objective indicia of non-obviousness,
such as commercial success, long-felt but unresolved needs, and failure of others in
performing the non-obvious analysis. Id. at 17-18.
104. The motivation is what distinguishes non-obviousness from "obvious to
try," a condition the courts have held does not constitute obviousness. See In re





difficult to establish as the universe of knowledge in that art
and the technical expertise of its practitioners increases (i.e.,
Graham elements 1 and 3105).
In applying this rationale to gene-based inventions, it may
prove more difficult to defend against an obviousness challenge
for the following reasons. First, the universe of knowledge in
the biotechnology arts encompasses many disciplines which are
highly developed technically (e.g., molecular biology, biochemis-
try, protein chemistry, computer sciences, cell biology, genetics,
genomics, medicinal chemistry, pharmacology, etc.). Secondly,
the skill level of the ordinary biotechnology practitioner is
highly advanced. 0 6 Thus, it will be increasingly difficult to
demonstrate that gene-based inventions are not made obvious
by the increasingly expansive scope of the biotechnology prior
art combined with the high level of skill of its practitioners. 107
At the very least, recognizable demarcations between obvious
and non-obviousness gene-based inventions are likely to become
blurred.
B. Gene-Based Inventions and the Utility Requirements
Even if gene-based inventions can avoid 35 U.S.C. § 103 ob-
viousness concerns, they still must satisfy the patentability re-
quirement of having a "specific," "substantial," and "practical"
utility. 0 For chemical or recombinant protein inventions,
courts have maintained that utility can be satisfied by demon-
strating that the compound has an experimentally validated bi-
ologic effect or is an intermediate in a known biochemical
105. See 383 U.S. at 17.
106. For example, the level of ordinary skill of molecular biologists, pharma-
cologists, chemists, and computer scientists are considered to be Ph.D's. See Aji-
nomoto v. Archer-Daniels-Midland, C.A. No. 95-218-SLR, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3833, *126 (D. Del. March 13, 1998). But education level is but one factor articu-
lated by the courts' that is relevant to a determination of the level of ordinary skill.
The others are: type of problems encountered in the art, prior art solutions, rapid-
ity of innovation, and sophistication of the technology. See also Bausch & Lomb v.
Barnes-Hind/Hydrocurve, 796 F.2d 443, 449-50 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
107. The obviousness challenge could be asserted by the examiner during
prosecution of the application or by the alleged infringer subsequent to patent
issuance.
108. See supra Part III-B.
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pathway.10 9 But the corollary to this is that compounds having
only a hypothetical, or experimentally unvalidated biological ef-
fect, or whose usefulness is simply as a research tool, will not
satisfy the 35 U.S.C. § 101 practical utility requirement. 110
Within this framework, it is likely that gene-based inven-
tions subsequent to human genome publication will have an up-
hill battle in establishing practical utility unless the actual
biological function of the gene is experimentally validated, ei-
ther through the inventor's own research or by the prior art.111
In that case, a showing of substantial structural homology" 2 be-
109. See In re Bremmer, 182 F.2d 216, 216 (C.C.P.A. 1950). See, e.g.,
Genentech v. Chiron Corp., 220 F.3d 1345, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2000). This case stems
from an interference action in the PTO between Genentech and Chiron over a pat-
ent dispute concerning the recombinant protein human insulin-like growth factor-
I. When Genentech filed their patent application they did not know the in vivo
biologic target for this protein, the only data they had was that it was bound to a
cellular receptor for the protein in the laboratory. The district court found that
this was enough to satisfy the practical utility requirement and awarded priority
of the invention to Genentech. Id. The Federal Circuit reversed holding that with-
out data showing the actual biologic "activity" of the protein, the inventors had not
determined "the intended purpose of the invention." Id.; accord Ex parte Maizel,
27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1662, 1668 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1992). In Maizel, the PTO
Board, in affirming the examiner's final rejection of Maizel's application, indicated
that a claimed recombinant protein (B-cell growth factor) whose biological function
was unknown as of the time of the patent application, would probably fail the stat-
utory utility requirement. (The examiner ultimately rejected the application for
reasons unrelated to utility). This was true despite the fact that the protein
shared structural similarity with proteins speculated to act as immune response
modulators. Id. See also In re Deuel, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1360, 1365, (Bd. Pat.
App. & Int. 1993), (where the PTO Board affirmed the examiner's final rejection of
Deuel's application for a purified protein having only a speculative biologic func-
tion based on structural homology to other proteins).
110. See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 535 (1966) (where a com-
pound's usefulness as a research tool did not satisfy the utility requirement).
111. A relatively recent technique used to predict a gene's biologic function is
by use of combinations of molecular biological and computer analysis called prote-
omics. The drive to define the biologic functions of newly discovered genes has
spawned a cottage industry of academic consortiums and proteomics companies
that hope to utilize this information for pharmaceutical applications. However, it
is unclear whether the PTO or the courts will accept a predicted biologic function
based on proteomics as an actual demonstration of utility. See, e.g., SwISSPROT,
THE HuMAN PROTEOMICS INITIATIVE, at http://us.expasy.org/sprot/hpi/hpi-desc.
html (last visited Dec. 3, 2003).
112. Structural homology is most often established using computer algo-
rithms, for example, the BLAST® (Basic Local Alignment Search Tool) program,
which compares a DNA or protein sequence to sequence databases and reports a
statistical score for the comparisons. National Center for Biotechnology Informa-
tion Homepage at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/BLAST (last visited Dec. 3, 2003).
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tween the newly discovered gene and other genes whose biologic
functions are experimentally validated will most likely satisfy
the statutory utility requirement. By contrast, newly discov-
ered genes sharing no substantial structural homology to genes
with known biologic function will likely fail the statutory utility
requirement and be unpatentable. 113 Hence, it is doubtful that
the identification of "new" genes stemming from the human
genome publication will, in and of itself, satisfy utility patenta-
bility standards (and therefore will be commercially impracti-
cal) until the actual biologic function(s) of those genes are
known. 114
Undoubtedly, one likely commercial application for newly
discovered genes will be the development, however, of
pharmaceuticals targeting the gene product(s). Pharmaceutical
development is a labor-intensive and costly undertaking typi-
cally unsuited for academic research programs or small-cap bi-
otech companies. 115 Thus, one likely result of the human
genome publication will be the stimulation of collaborative ar-
113. See, e.g., Revised Interim Utility Guidelines Training Materials (Jan. 5,
2001), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/utility.pdf. Example 9 is di-
rected to genes whose protein products have no known biologic function, in which
case the examiner is instructed to reject the claim for lack of utility. Id. at 50-53.
Example 10 is directed to a gene whose protein product has 95% structural homol-
ogy to other proteins with known biologic activity, in which case the examiner is
instructed not to reject for lack of utility. Id. at 53-55. It is noteworthy that the
gene in Example 9 is found to be without patentable utility despite the fact that
the gene can be used as a molecular probe.
114. The departure of Dr. Craig Venter, the founder of Celera Genomics, from
the company leadership is evidence of the lack of commercial utility of newly dis-
covered genes per se. Celera, apparently recognizing that the commercial utility of
the genome is in pharmaceutical development, not in the genes themselves, de-
cided to replace Dr. Venter with a CEO with pharmaceutical experience. Pollack,
supra note 21.
115. The average cost to bring a new drug to market is estimated to be $500
million. It is further estimated that it takes an average of 12-15 years to discover
and develop a new medicine. A significant portion of the cost of drug development
stems from the strict requirements for efficacy, safety, and clinical studies man-
dated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for drugs sold in the United
States. See THE PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA,
WHY DO PRESCRIPTION DRUGS COST So MUCH ... AND OTHER QUESTIONS ABOUT
YOUR MEDICINES 2, available at http://www.phrma.org/publications/publications/
brochure/questions/questions.pdf (last visited Dec. 22, 2003). This is one reason
why many American-manufactured pharmaceuticals are evaluated clinically and
first released into European markets where regulatory scrutiny is considerably
less stringent. See Jennifer Kulynych, Will FDA Relinquish the "Gold Standard"
for New Drug Approval? Redefining "Substantial Evidence" in the FDA Moderniza-
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rangements between large-cap pharmaceutical companies and
academic research institutions and small-cap biotechnology
companies, where licensing arrangements could provide for
shared risks and rewards for gene-based pharmaceutical
development. 116
C. Gene-Based Inventions and the Enablement Requirements
In addition to the requirements that an invention must be
novel, 1 7 non-obvious," 8 and have a practical utility,1 9 to be
patentable the invention must also satisfy the 35 U.S.C. § 112
enablement requirement.120 This requirement refers to the obli-
gation that the inventor must describe how to make and use the
invention to one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.121 The
purpose of this requirement is to ensure that the public can ben-
efit from the invention. 22 The standard for determining
whether the patent disclosure complies with the enablement re-
quirement does not preclude that some experimentation by the
ordinary skilled worker is necessary to practice the invention;
but the amount of experimentation "must not be unduly exten-
sive." 23 The courts have interpreted the statute to require that
the claimed invention be enabled by the disclosure so that one
tion Act of 1997, 54 FOOD DRUG L.J. 127, 138-39 (1999). See generally Michael
Barum et al., Patent Rights And Licensing, 6 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 3 (2000).
116. See Barunm et al., supra note 115, g 47-49.
117. Governed by 35 U.S.C. § 102; see supra Part III-B.
118. Governed by 35 U.S.C. § 103; see supra Part III-C.
119. Governed by 35 U.S.C. § 101; see supra Part V-B.
120. 35 U.S.C. § 112. The enablement requirement actually includes two dis-
tinct requirements that are both found in the first paragraph of the statute. The
first requirement refers to the aforementioned obligation to allow one of ordinary
skill to "make and use the invention." Id. The second requirement is that the
inventor "is in possession of the invention" as of the date of filing the application.
Id. This latter requirement is referred to as the "written description" requirement
and was discussed supra in Part IV regarding the patentability of DNA sequences.
121. Atlas Powder v. Dupont, 750 F.2d 1569, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("To be
enabling under § 112, a patent must contain a description that enables one skilled
in the art to make and use the claimed invention.") (citation omitted).
122. See CHISUM ON PATENTS § 7.03 (2003) ("The policy behind Section 112 is
to make a patented invention fully available to the public without any requirement
of such arduous research.").




of ordinary skill can make and use it without "undue
experimentation." 124
1. Undue Experimentation: The Wands Factors
In In re Wands, the court identified eight factors to consider
in determining whether one having ordinary skill in the art
would be required to perform "undue experimentation" to prac-
tice a claimed invention. These factors are: (1) the quantity of
experimentation necessary; (2) the amount of direction or gui-
dance presented; (3) the presence or absence of working exam-
ples; (4) the nature of the invention; (5) the state of the prior
art; (6) the relative skill of those in the art; (7) the predictability
or unpredictability of the art; and (8) the breadth of the
claims.125
It is clear that the Wands factors are dynamic; that is, they
will vary with the development of the knowledge base of a given
discipline and the skill of its practitioners. With that in mind,
the Wands factors should provide the courts with a simple pro-
cedure for allowing the patentability standards of biotechnology
of inventions to evolve as biotechnology evolves. Yet, this has
not happened; the courts continue to apply a strict enabling re-
quirement to biotechnology inventions, particularly to DNA
claims.126
VI. Increased Litigation Due to Invalid Patents
There is little doubt that one result of the publication of the
human genome will be a flood of new patent applications claim-
ing the products and uses of the recombinant proteins of the
newly discovered genes. Because the biologic activity of many
of these genes and their protein products will be merely specu-
124. See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736-37 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Enablement is
not precluded by the necessity for some experimentation .... However, experi-
mentation needed to practice the invention must not be undue experimentation.").
125. Id. at 737.
126. See, e.g., Enzo Biochem. v. Calgene, 188 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999),
where the court, applying the Amgen /Fiers ILilly rationale (See supra Part IV),
held that the patent's broad claims to the use of antisense DNA technology (a tech-
nology that inhibits protein synthesis by preventing the expression of the gene
encoding that protein) were not enabled because the specification disclosed only a
limited number of examples for bacterial genes and such limited disclosures were
not commensurate with the broad scope of the patent claims.
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lative at the time of patent application, this is likely to produce
an increase in the number of patentability disputes in the PTO
as well as increased litigation concerning the validity of issued
patents to these genes. This is particularly true for genes
whose biologic activities are merely "predicted" based on struc-
tural homology. 127 Both the PTO128 and the courts have recog-
nized that a "predicted" function based on structural homology
to compounds having a known practical use satisfies the practi-
cal utility requirement, 129 but neither have defined the amount
of structural homology that will suffice for this purpose, partic-
ularly as this relates to protein homology. The examples pro-
vided in the most recent PTO Utility Guidelines suggests that
the extent of structural homology between proteins required to
satisfy practical utility must be extremely high. 130 The problem
here is that it has long been known in the protein biochemistry
art that there is not a direct relationship between the extent of
127. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
128. The PTO rejected the arguments that the use of computer-based analysis
to assign functions to newly discovered genes based on homology to prior art pro-
teins should not be allowed due to the unpredictability of the assignments. It held
that "when a patent application claiming a nucleic acid asserts a specific, substan-
tial, and credible utility, and bases the assertion upon homology to existing nucleic
acids or proteins having an accepted utility, the asserted utility must be accepted
by the examiner unless the Office has sufficient evidence or sound scientific rea-
soning to rebut such an assertion." Utility Interim Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092,
1096 (Jan. 5, 2001).
129. A biotechnology case discussing the use of structural similarity to evi-
dence practical utility is Kridl v. McCormick, 105 F.3d 1446, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1997),
in which the invention consisted of the use of anti-sense recombinant DNA tech-
nology to make virus-resistant plants. The court held that "[tihe utility of the in-
vention need not always be explicitly corroborated. Circumstances may make a
utility implicit, as they did here. The evidence here indicates that a person of ordi-
nary skill in the art would have accepted [the inventor's] testimony of intended use
of his invention at the time of his conception." Thus, the court, while not ruling
directly on the structural homology issue, found that for some biotechnology inven-
tions, such as anti-sense recombinant proteins, the utility of the invention is inher-
ent in the invention itself. While this holding may provide guidance for anti-sense
recombinant protein inventions it does little to offer guidance for traditional (i.e.,
"sense") recombinant protein inventions. See also Rey-Bellet v. Schindler, 493
F.2d 1380 (C.C.P.A. 1974); In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1995),
("[Elvidence of success in structurally similar compounds is relevant in determin-
ing whether one skilled in the art would believe an asserted utility."). But see In re
Joly, 376 F.2d 906, 908 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (compounds whose only known utility was
to provide for further research did not satisfy the utility requirements for
patentability).
130. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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structural homology between proteins and their biologic proper-
ties. 131 Therefore, the PTO may have created patentability
standards that are in conflict with the realities concerning pro-
tein structure/function relationships. 132 This conflict will likely
precipitate litigation as the courts attempt to resolve this issue.
VII. Economic Considerations: Increased Licensing Due to
Uncertainty of Patentability
Until the courts resolve the many complex issues concern-
ing the validity of patents claiming genes and their encoded
proteins in light of the publication of the human genome, there
will remain considerable uncertainty as to the commercial value
of property rights to many of these inventions. Considering
that the costs of litigation for biotechnology patents is ex-
tremely high, estimated to exceed one million dollars for the av-
erage litigation, 133 combined with the fact that biotechnology
patents are more frequently litigated than any other kind of
technology,1 34 it may be advantageous for patentees to dis-
tribute the risks involved in potential litigation by licensing in-
ventions rather than maintaining exclusive rights to them. 135
131. For example, proteins with as little as 40% structural homology may
share nearly identical biologic properties. See, e.g., Y. Naoi et al., The Functional
Similarity and Structural Diversity of Human and Cartilaginous Fish Hemoglo-
bins, 307 J. MOL. BIOL. 259-70 (2001).
132. The flip side is that if there is substantial structural homology between a
prior art protein whose biologic activity is known and the newly discovered protein
(gene) then this could arguably result in the finding that the newly discovered
protein was obvious compared to the prior art and hence unpatentable. Such a
result occurred in In re Mayne, 104 F.3d 1339, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In this case,
the inventors challenged a final rejection of their patent application pertaining to
the production and use of recombinant proteins. The PTO Board rejected the ap-
plication on the basis of § 103 obviousness of the present invention based on the
structural similarity of the recombinant proteins to those in the prior art. The
Federal Circuit affirmed the rejection stating that "[Sitructural similarity between
claimed and prior art subject matter, proved by combining references or otherwise,
where the prior art gives reason or motivation to make the claimed compositions,
creates a prima facie case of obviousness.") (citation omitted).
133. See Mary Ann Tucker, Corporate Counsel's Role In Patent Litigation, in
PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE: PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY
PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 279, 296 (1995).
134. See Barum et al., supra note 115.
135. A working theory is that if there are many "invalid" patents in an area of
potential investment, this would: (1) discourage investment by increasing costs of
entry, i.e., potential investors will have more patents to investigate for potential
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Arrangements could be made that include contingencies in the
event the patent application fails to issue or is subsequently in-
validated. 136 Such arrangements could encourage development
of products whose patentability is uncertain. This approach
may be particularly significant to small-cap biotechnology com-
panies whose product development decision-making is more
likely influenced by patent litigation costs, 137 but will also be
useful to academic research programs who are likely to benefit
from risk-sharing arrangements.
VIII. Conclusions
The publication of the first draft of the human genome on
February 16, 2001 will have the effect of making subsequent
inventions claiming human genes or gene-fragments that were
disclosed unpatentable due to lack of novelty (35 U.S.C. § 102)
and obviousness (35 U.S.C. § 103).138 The patentability of in-
ventions claiming recombinant human proteins and products
infringement or to license from; and (2) it will reduce the number of potential en-
trants because some patentees will not wish to dilute their property rights by li-
censing and others will not want to bear the high costs of litigation and/or
licensing. From this reasoning an empirical formula can be developed whereby a
rational investor will license when the costs of the license is less than the likeli-
hood of success in the litigation multiplied by the likely infringement damages
plus litigation costs.
136. In this regard, Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979), is
illustrative. In this case, the patent applicants negotiated a contract with a manu-
facturing company for the manufacture and sale of a keyholder prior to their pat-
ent issuing. Id. at 259. The contract called for royalties to be paid to the patentee
in return for an exclusive license to make and sell the keyholders. The amount of
royalties were conditioned on the patent issuing within five years, if the patent
failed to issue within that time the licensor's royalties would be reduced. Id. at
260. When the patent application was rejected by the PTO the licensor sued to
hold the licensing arrangement void. The United States Supreme Court held that
the license arrangements were enforceable contracts that were independent of
product patentability. Id. at 262. This holding, therefore, protects the interests of
both licensors and licensees by permitting shared risk in developing products
whose patentability is uncertain.
137. See Josh Lerner, Patenting In the Shadow Of Competitors, 38 J.L. &
ECON. 463, 465 (1995).
138. The 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) novelty bar begins for gene-based inventions after
February 16, 2002; the 35 U.S.C. § 103 non-obviousness standard is measured
from February 16, 2001. Also, as stated in supra Part V, gene variants, mutants,
and polymorphisms not described in the human genome publication, as well as
DNA sequences not yet recognized as genes remain patentable until one year after




associated with recombinant proteins will to a large extent de-
pend upon whether they will be considered anticipated and ob-
vious in light of the genome publication and the scope of prior
biotechnology commercialization for that product. Application
of previously commercialized products to newly discovered
genes will have an uphill battle to defend against statutory an-
ticipation and obviousness. Current standards for the 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 written description requirement 139 for genes will be
mooted by the genome publication. Confusion as to what pat-
entability standards apply following the genome publication
will likely lead to increased litigation that could effect patenting
decisions in both academic and commercial settings. Licensing
of gene-based inventions may increase as a method for balanc-
ing risks until the courts consider what changes, if any, they are
willing to make to accommodate the patentability issues raised
by the genome publication. Ultimately, however, the publica-
tion of the human genome could stimulate much-needed reform
regarding patentability standards for biotechnology inventions
and hopefully result in increased predictability and efficiency
for the commercialization of this rapidly evolving technology.
139. See supra Parts IV and V.
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